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INTRODUCTION
Professor Secunda ably documents the approaches of OECD
nations to protecting wage and pension claims in insolvency,
particularly priorities and guarantee schemes. His Article will
therefore be an important resource to employment, bankruptcy, and
international law. The Article should be useful not only to academics,
practitioners, government agencies, NGOs, and labor organizations,
but also to law reformers. Professor Secunda correctly notes that the
United States has longstanding guarantee schemes for unemployment
and retirement income, but its bankruptcy priorities for employmentbased claims are not particularly strong. His thesis is that the United
States—with a “Limited Model Two” system of guarantees and
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priorities1—can learn from Canada’s recently enacted Wage Earner
Protection Program Act (WEPPA).2 WEPPA provides a government
guarantee of unpaid wages and related amounts, and a super-priority
“charge” on debtor assets for wages, vacation pay, and pension
contributions in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) proceedings
(liquidations and smaller company reorganizations).3
For the past twenty-five years, I have represented the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the nation’s pension insurer,
practicing both employee benefits and bankruptcy law.
At
Georgetown University Law Center (GULC), where I have been an
adjunct professor for more than twenty years, I have taught both
pension insurance law and comparative bankruptcy law. For the past
year, I have served on the Labor and Benefits Advisory Committee to
the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Commission to Study the
Reform of Chapter 11 (Commission).
My experience is therefore with collective and institutional
solutions to insolvency problems. The PBGC itself administers an
insolvency system for terminated pension plans,4 in addition to
participating in major corporate bankruptcies. Based on that
experience, I believe that keeping businesses and pension plans going
despite bankruptcy is where we should focus our efforts.5
As documented by Professor James Wooten in his study, Political
History,6 ERISA is the result of compromise, between workforce

1. His taxonomy, Model One (Bankruptcy Priority, Little or No Guarantee),
Model Two (Robust) (Bankruptcy Priority and Guarantee for Both Pensions and
Wages), Model Two (Limited) (Bankruptcy Priority and Guarantee for either
Pensions or Wages), and Model Three (No or Limited Bankruptcy Priority, But
Some Form of Guarantee) derives from GORDON JOHNSON, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., INSOLVENCY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION: EMPLOYEE
ENTITLEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF EMPLOYER BANKRUPTCY (2006), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/38184691.pdf
2. Paul M. Secunda, An Analysis of the Treatment of Employee Pension and

Wage Claims in Insolvency and Under Guarantee Schemes in OECD Countries:
Comparative Law Lessons for Detroit and the United States, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
867, 876 (2014).
3. See generally Wage Earner Protection Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 1
(Can.); see also Secunda supra note 2 at 876–77.
4. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1301–1461 (2012).
5. Fiona Stewart argues that there is great leverage in strong funding rules, curbs
against moral hazard and adverse selection, and proper enforcement tools. See
generally Fiona Stewart, Benefit Security Pension Fund Guarantee Schemes (Org.
for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Working Paper No. 5, 2007), available at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/52/34770674.pdf.
6. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY (2004).
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management and worker protection objectives, and between labor
and tax policy, among other things. ERISA is also the product of
what we now call Rahm’s Rule, “You never want a serious crisis to go
to waste.”7 National pension reform was inspired by the Studebaker
shutdown in 1963.8 And Congress rushed to enact ERISA in the
summer of 1974, believing that it would spend the rest of the session
on the Nixon impeachment proceedings.9
In the bankruptcy area, I recommend an equally important book,
Professor David Skeel’s Debt’s Dominion,10 tracing the history of
bankruptcy laws in the United States and the political forces behind
them. For those familiar with modern credit-bid proceedings, Skeel’s
account of SEC Chairman William O. Douglas’s attempt to curb
similar practices in the 1938 Chandler Act11 evokes déjà vu.12
At times, it seems that Congress no sooner acts than the seams
begin to open, leading to demand for fresh reforms, sometimes in the
opposite direction. For example, at least in retrospect, some said that
the Pension Protection Act of 2006’s (the PPA’s)13 funding reforms
were inadequate.14 But just as PPA took effect, the Great Recession
began. In short order, Congress enacted temporary relief provisions,
and followed with additional relief provisions in the next several
years.15 The debate continues on what funding regime is necessary to
adequately protect pensions without driving employers out of the
system.16
7. In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122721278056345271 (quoting Rahm Emanuel,
White House Chief of Staff).
8. See James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”:
The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV.
683, 683 (2001) [hereinafter Wooten, Most Glorious Story]; see also WOOTEN, supra
note 6, at 260–62. This illustrates John Kingdon’s “policy streams” model, that when
the problem stream, the policy stream, and the politics stream flow together, a
window opens for policy entrepreneurs. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS,
ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1995); see also Wooten, Most Glorious Story,
supra at 725–26.
9. See WOOTEN, supra note 6, at 260–62.
10. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA (2001).
11. Id. at 90–127.
12. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
13. Pension Protection Act, Pub. L. 109–280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006).
14. See e.g., David D. Hanss, Too Little, Too Late: Why the Pension Protection
Act of 2006 Will Not Live Up to Its Name, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 509, 540 (2008).
15. See e.g., Worker, Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 110-458,
122 Stat. 5092 (2008).
16. See Hanss, supra note 14, at 549–51; see also Mark Miller, Do No Harm:
Protecting Retirees in Shaky Pension Plans, REUTERS, June 26, 2013, available at
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Similarly, the Bankruptcy Abuse, Prevention, and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA)17 was seen as favoring creditors
and hindering reorganization due to such measures as shorter
exclusive periods for the debtor to propose a reorganization plan and
solicit votes. Like PPA, BAPCPA was enacted shortly before the
Great Recession. As demand slackened, bankruptcies increased,
though in some cases distressed companies could not obtain DIP
financing, suggesting that economic conditions were more influential
than BAPCPA’s lender-driven reforms.18
Last year, the American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI)19 formed its
Commission, based on the concern that “the use of secured credit, the
growth of distressed-debt markets and other externalities have
affected the effectiveness of the current Bankruptcy Code.”20 The
Commission’s Labor and Benefits Advisory Committee includes

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/26/us-column-miller-seniordebtidUSBRE95P15T20130626; Stephen Miller, President Signs Pension Funding Relief
SOC’Y
FOR
HUM.
RESOURCE
MGMT.
(July
6,
2012),
Measure,
http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/benefits/articles/pages/reliefmeasure.aspx.
17. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
18. See John J. Rapisardi, TalkingPoint: US Bankruptcy, FINANCIERWORLDWIDE
(Oct.
2009),
http://www.financierworldwide.com/article_printable.php?id=6835.
(“Driven by the global credit crisis and low consumer demand, the US bankruptcy
market has become increasingly active over the past 18 months, with commercial
bankruptcies having jumped 42 percent in July 2009 over the same period last year. It
is unlikely that the ‘worst’ is over. The fortunes of many industries—particularly
retail, hospitality, aviation and automotive—are tied to US consumer spending,
which basically went ‘on strike’ after the financial markets crashed in late 2008. Yet
many businesses elected against filing for Chapter 11 because DIP financing was not
available or they had no exit strategy.” (quoting Aaron L. Hammer, Partner,
Freeborn & Peters LLP)). Despite a wave of bankruptcy filings during the
Recession, a considerable number of pension plan sponsors successfully reorganized
and kept their pensions between 2009 and 2011. Putting aside the special cases of
General Motors and Chrysler, they included major auto parts, chemical, financial
services, food, media, retail, and packaging companies. See, e.g., JOSH GOTBAUM,
PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 2010 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT (2010), available at
https://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2010_annual_report.pdf
(“If
a
company
enters
bankruptcy, PBGC becomes an active advocate, urging reorganizing sponsors to keep
their plans if possible. In FY 2010, PBGC’s efforts ensured that plans sponsored by
LyondellBasell Industries, Smurfit-Stone, Lear Corp., and more than 30 other
companies survived Chapter 11 bankruptcies. Their 250,000 employees and retirees
continue to enjoy their full benefits, and are still protected by PBGC insurance
coverage.”).
19. The ABI’s mission includes providing Congress and the public with unbiased
analysis of bankruptcy issues. See About ABI, AM. BANKR. INST.,
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=About_ABI (last visited Mar.
15, 2014).
20. Purpose of the Commission, AM. BANKR. INST., http://commission.abi.org/
purpose-commission (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
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management and union practitioners, academics, and a sitting
bankruptcy judge.21
Though Chapter 11’s treatment of employment and pension claims
are fairly well known,22 and law reform efforts have begun, treatment
of “legacy” costs in Chapter 9 is still relatively untested. The Detroit
bankruptcy might become an example of treating a pension program
as a restructuring project in its own right. The Emergency Manager
froze pension plans for certain city workers (though the decision has
been stayed), intending to establish a defined contribution plan for
future service.23 If ERISA applied to governmental plans, that would
in all likelihood be considered a settlor function (reserved to the
employer’s business judgment and unreviewable),24 and not a
violation of the anti-cutback rule.25 But in a municipal bankruptcy,
the issue is fraught with constitutional and federalism concerns.26
In one well-known case, a governmental plan sought to reorganize
under Chapter 11. The effort failed, as a pension plan is not an entity
entitled to be a debtor under Chapter 11.27 But reformers have
already focused on the issue.28
Professor Secunda’s Article is mainly devoted to private-sector
plans. I had suggested that Professor Secunda give more attention to

21. See Labor and Benefits Issues, AM. BANKR. INST., http://commission.abi.org/
node/15 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
22. See, e.g., DANIEL L. KEATING, BANKRUPTCY AND EMPLOYMENT LAW:
BANKRUPTCY’S IMPACT ON EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYEES, UNIONS, AND RETIREES (1995).
23. See Matt Helms, Orr Issues Stay on Freezing Pensions for Detroit Workers as
Mediation Continues, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 6, 2014, http://www.freep.com/
article/20140106/NEWS/301060055/Detroit-pension-freeze-Orr;
Mary
Williams
Walsh, A Proposal to Freeze Pensions in Detroit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2013,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/26/detroit-manager-seeks-to-freeze-pensionplan.
24. See Beck v. PACE Int’l Union, 551 U.S. 96, 101 (2007).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (2012).
26. See Claire Groden, The Wages of Bankruptcy: Stockton’s Cautionary Tale for
Detroit, TIME (July 25, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/07/25/the-wages-ofbankruptcy-stocktons-cautionary-tale-for-detroit.
27. See Hazel Bradford, Northern Mariana Islands Pension Bankruptcy Bid
Dismissed, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (June 18, 2012), http://www.pionline.com/
article/20120618/DAILYREG/120619892; see also In re N. Mariana Islands Ret.
Fund, No. 12-00003, 2012 WL 8654317, at *1 (D.N. Mar. I. June 13, 2012) (citing 11
U.S.C. § 109(d) (2012)). Nor does it appear that a pension plan could be a debtor
under Chapter 9. See § 109(c)(1).
28. See Andrew Dawson, Minutes of ABI Commission, LAB. & BENEFITS
ADVISORY COMMITTEE (May 24, 2013), available at http://commission.abi.org/sites/
default/files/May%2024%202013%20meeting%20minutes.docx, (“Public Employee
Plans: discussed whether governmental pension plans should be eligible to be debtors
under either chapter 9 or 11 of the Code.”).
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some of the factors I have introduced here: protections for ongoing
pension plans and the insurance system, such as appropriate funding
rules; the vagaries of legislation, including congressional committee
jurisdictional issues, compromises made in “must-pass” legislation,
and Rahm’s Rule; and bankruptcy reform efforts already underway
on the labor side, such as H.R. 100, and the proceedings of the
Commission.
Professor Secunda has adopted some of these
suggestions. With this response, I add some pragmatic points that
could be further developed.
I have no suggestions for Chapter 9 reform. But despite the
different reorganization and employment law regimes, it seems
inevitable that parallels will be drawn between corporate and
municipal bankruptcies.
I. PROTECTIONS FOR ONGOING PLANS AND THE INSURANCE
SYSTEM
Professor Secunda treats bankruptcy priority and government
guarantees as alternatives for protecting worker and retiree claims in
the event of employer insolvency. They are not necessarily exclusive,
he notes, as claims for benefits above the guarantee should not simply
disappear.29
Given his focus on “Employment Claims,” with guarantee schemes
as a potential means for protecting them, Professor Secunda
appropriately recognizes the need to protect the guarantee scheme
itself.30 On that issue, Stewart argues that not only is sound funding of
pensions the primary bulwark, but where funding requirements are
extremely conservative (as in the Netherlands), there is probably no
29. In the seminal case on pension insurance under ERISA, the Supreme Court
said that the employer could disclaim direct liability to its employees beyond amounts
funded. See Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 446 U.S. 359, 378–84 (1980). But some courts
recognized a claim for benefits beyond the PBGC guarantee under Section 301(a) of
the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)(2014) (providing
for enforcement of labor agreements). E.g., Murphy v. Heppenstall Co., 635 F.2d 233
(3d Cir. 1980).
In 1986 and 1987, Congress increased PBGC’s claim beyond unfunded
guaranteed benefits to all unfunded benefit liabilities, and imposed a recoverysharing formula on PBGC with respect to non-guaranteed benefits. 29 U.S.C. §
1322(c) (2012). The courts have held that these enactments displaced the federal
common law under Heppenstall and United Steelworkers v. United Engineering,
Inc., 52 F.3d 1386 (6th Cir. 1995), and that in bankruptcy, any such claim duplicates
PBGC claims and should be disallowed, e.g., In re Adams Hard Facing Co., 129 B.R.
662 (W.D. Okla. 1991). Like workers’ compensation laws, this regime substitutes a
formulaic administrative recovery for a greater but uncertain recovery in litigation.
See Secunda, supra note 2, at 894–98.
30. Secunda, supra note 2, at 913–15.
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need for a guarantee scheme. For those guarantee schemes that do
exist (in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany,
Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Japan, and Ontario), she argues, it is
important to guard against the moral hazard of employers’ increasing
benefits during the spiral toward insolvency; to impose limits on
benefits guaranteed; to give the regulator or the insurer the necessary
tools to manage risk (including both investment risk and business risk,
which are often correlated); to require appropriate premiums without
forcing good risks to unduly subsidize bad risks; and, to be sure, to
require sound funding and provide appropriate priority in
bankruptcy.31
Professor Secunda also acknowledges the importance of recoveries
for the guarantee scheme.32 In my experience, however, there is more
leverage in shoring up pension funding (assuming it does not drive
good risks out of the system) and deterring unwarranted terminations
in the first place.33
Among the ideas that have been proposed are:
• Requiring a debtor in possession to make minimum funding
contributions as they fall due, much as Congress has required
debtors in possession to adhere to collective bargaining
agreements and to pay retiree medical benefits until modified.
• Giving unpaid minimum funding contributions falling due postpetition an administrative priority.

31. Stewart, supra note 5, at 3–8. The UAW, which developed the idea of public
“pension reinsurance” in the 1960s, shared such concerns. See Wooten, Most
Glorious Story, supra note 8, at 725–26.
32. Secunda, supra note 2, at 879–80, 886–90.
33. See generally, e.g., In re Philip Servs. Corp., 310 B.R. 802 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2004) (debtor asserted that it could not reorganize if it had to continue its pension
plans, but did just that while the adjudication was pending). In 2005, Congress
enacted a “termination premium,” $1250 per participant for three years, payable to
PBGC. Congress specified that where the plan terminates during bankruptcy, the
claim does not arise until after the debtor is discharged. 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(7)(B)
(2012). As a result, the claim escapes discharge, and is payable one hundred-cents on
the dollar by the reorganized debtor. See generally PBGC v. Oneida Ltd., 562 F.3d
154 (2d Cir. 2009). Congress intended the termination premium to be a factor in
deterring plan termination, despite bankruptcy. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-276, at 62,
348–49 (accompanying H.R. 4241) (“termination premiums would be paid for three
consecutive years once a company emerges from bankruptcy”); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 109-745, at 33 (discussing H.R. 4); 151 CONG. REC. H11666 (daily ed. Dec. 15,
2005) (statement of Rep. Souter) (arguing that H.R. 2830 will require “employers
that terminate their pensions in bankruptcy to pay an annual premium of $1,250 per
participant to the PBGC for the 3 years after they emerge from bankruptcy”).
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Exempting the attachment and perfection of minimum funding
liens from the automatic stay.34
Of course, as Professor Secunda notes, there are countervailing
arguments, such as disruption of the capital markets.35 Indeed,
lenders and investors are increasingly insisting that companies be
cleansed of legacy liabilities, often through a “free and clear” asset
sale under Bankruptcy Code Section 363.36
I expect that other
scholars will develop the opposing arguments.
II. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Stewart notes that pension guarantee funds in the United States,
Ontario, and the United Kingdom were established to deal with
political and economic crises attendant to the decline of the industrial
sector.
Indeed, she argues, pension insurance under ERISA
intentionally subsidizes failing firms, at the risk of serious market
distortions.37
Pensions are the province of four committees of jurisdiction: the
labor committees (Senate HELP and House Education &
Workforce), and the “tax writing” committees (Senate Finance and
House Ways & Means). Bankruptcy is the province of the Judiciary
committees. In arguing for greater priority in bankruptcy, Professor

34. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b), 503(b), 507(a)(2), 1113, 1114 (2012); see ABI COMM’N TO
STUDY REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, STATEMENT OF HON. JOSHUA GOTBAUM (2013),
available at http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/Gotbaum-ABI-Statement.pdf.
35. Secunda, supra note 2, at 891–92.
36. ABI COMM’N TO STUDY REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 34, at 3–4.
Private equity firms have recently used section 363 sales to retain control of defaulted
portfolio companies by “credit-bidding” their secured claims, thereby deterring
potential competitive bids. Id. See generally RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v.
Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012) (upholding right to credit bid even under
a debtor-propounded plan of reorganization). So far, no solution has emerged to
credit bids by controlling parties, though some unsecured creditors have been able to
get a portion of the sale proceeds set aside for their claims. See Randall Chase,
Attorneys Say Coda Bankruptcy Issues Resolved, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 29, 2013,
available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/coda-bonuses-pulled-more-bankruptcyissues-remain; ABI COMM’N TO STUDY REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 34, at 4
(suggesting that the Commission consider requiring cash bids, that security be
marked to market, a fifty-percent set-aside, or assumption of pension obligations).
See generally In re Daufuskie Island Props., 441 B.R. 60, 66 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2010);
37. Stewart, supra note 5, at 5–6; see also Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and Brief Amicus Curiae of Armco, et al.,
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990) (No. 89-390), 1989
WL 1127271, at *6 (asserting that if LTV is permitted to terminate its pensions plans
and establish follow-on plans largely replacing uninsured benefits, LTV would have
an unfair advantage, and other integrated steelmakers would have to pursue the same
course).
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Secunda inevitably raises the question whether this can be
accomplished under ERISA or the Tax Code, or whether, given the
jurisdictional concerns, it must be done as part of bankruptcy
reform.38
As Professor Secunda notes, ERISA provides for a lien and for tax
treatment for unpaid minimum funding contributions where the
unpaid balance exceeds $1 million.39 ERISA provides similar
treatment for the plan’s unfunded benefit liabilities (the difference
between benefit liabilities and assets), subject to “net worth” limits.40
By and large, however, the courts have rejected the argument that
these provisions are effective to establish priority claims in
bankruptcy. For example, the Tenth Circuit has held that without an
“explicit connector” in the Bankruptcy Code itself (rather than in
ERISA or the Tax Code), those provisions are ineffective in
attempting to establish a priority tax claim in bankruptcy.41 Thus, one
might suggest Congress cannot effectively do so without amending
the Bankruptcy Code.42
The employer made a similar argument in the Oneida case.43 The
issue was whether the termination premium is a “claim,” to be treated
in a plan of reorganization and discharged, or, as ERISA provides, an
obligation that does not arise until after discharge. Relying on recent
Supreme Court decisions on choice of law in bankruptcy, however,
the Second Circuit held that “we look to the substantive nonbankruptcy law that gives rise to the debtor’s obligation,” in that case
the ERISA provisions on when the obligation arises.44
Oneida represents the emerging mainstream view on choice of law
in bankruptcy.45 But Professor Secunda is operating in the political
realm. The thorny jurisdictional issues in Congress must still be
reckoned with.

38. See generally David C. King, The Nature of Congressional Committee
Jurisdictions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 48 (1994), available at http://www.unc.edu/~
fbaum/teaching/PLSC541_Fall08/king_1994.pdf (arguing that jurisdictional change in
Congress takes place through bill referral precedents).
39. 26 U.S.C. § 430(k) (2012).
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1362(d), 1368(c)–(e) (2012).
41. In re CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 150 F.3d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir. 1998).
42. See King, supra note 38, at 48–62.
43. Brief of Appellee at 39–40, Pension Ben. Guar. Corporation v. Oneida, Ltd.,
562 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 08-2964-bk).
44. Oneida, 562 F.3d at 157 (citations omitted).
45. See In re U.S. Airways Grp., 296 B.R. 734 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003) (upholding
PBGC’s “valuation regulation” for the same reason, that bankruptcy accepts nonbankruptcy law as the rule of decision unless the Bankruptcy Code specifically
overrides it).
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Moreover, the legislative process can take some unexpected turns,
especially in the case of “must-pass” legislation. For example, even in
the “Golden Age of Bi-Partisanship,” 1978–87, at least “25 nongermane amendments were attached to debt-limit bills . . . including
allowing voluntary school prayer, banning busing to achieve
integration and proposing a nuclear freeze.”46 Given that dynamic, a
legislative advocate would be well advised to have draft provisions
ready to offer when the opportunity arises. Professor Secunda may
therefore want to turn next to preparing legislative text that embodies
his proposals.
Finally, Professor Daniel Keating provided some sobering thoughts
in this area in his testimony before the ABI Commission. At times an
advocate of greater priority for employment and pension claims,47
Keating urges non-bankruptcy solutions, such as advance funding for
retiree medical benefits. He cautions that employers can plan around
“springing priorities,” by using 363 sales to avoid retiree claims; that
priorities can make reorganization more difficult; that liquidation can
make priorities irrelevant; and that priorities can deter lending.48
Though Professor Secunda acknowledges these concerns,49 he has not
suggested ways to overcome or mitigate them.
III. BANKRUPTCY REFORM EFFORTS IN PROCESS
Though the United States has no guarantee of unpaid wages, both
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and state wage laws provide
significant penalties for missing a payroll, including double damages
and personal liability for corporate officers under certain
circumstances.50 In Chapter 11 cases, courts routinely approve
payment of wages in “first-day orders,” even for the pay period that

46. Rich
Lowry,
The
Intransigents,
POLITICO
(Oct.
3,
2013),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/the-intransigents-rich-lowry-97759.html.
47. See generally Daniel Keating, Chapter 11’s New Ten-Ton Monster: The
PBGC and Bankruptcy, 77 MINN. L. REV. 803 (1993).
48. Daniel Keating, Some Lessons for Congress to Ponder About the LaborBankruptcy Intersection: Hearing Before the ABI Commission (June 7, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/
statements/07jun2013/ABI_Testimony_Oral_Remarks.pdf; see also The Fruits of
Labor: Worker Priorities in Bankruptcy, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 905, 917–18 (1993)
(arguing for unionized employees to use their natural leverage, rather than seek
legislative reform on bankruptcy priorities).
49. Secunda, supra note 2, at 891–92.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2012); see e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 191, 197, 198 (McKinney
2009).
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spans the petition date.51 And post-petition wages have an express
administrative priority.52
In a reorganization, therefore, employees are likely most
concerned not with being paid for work performed but with keeping
their jobs, as Professor Secunda seems to acknowledge.53 In a sale to
a strategic buyer, redundancies may result in headcount reductions.
Even in an internal reorganization, rationalization of the business
may result in downsizing. In any case, the debtor may seek to reduce
wages and benefits, and modify manning requirements and other
work rules.54 I therefore wonder whether a wage guarantee fund, as
under Canada’s WEPPA, is as important as Professor Secunda
suggests.55 In the area of pay, Professor Secunda might better focus
on severance pay, which is generally not considered a priority.56
More broadly, as Professor Secunda notes, employers and
employees do not have equal bargaining power. That is the premise
of the National Labor Relations Act.57 Moreover, union membership

51. JOHN D. AYER & MICHAEL L. BERNSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY IN PRACTICE 304 (4th
ed. 2007).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (2012).
53. Secunda, supra note 2, at 871–72, 891. This may be an important concern in
Chapter 7 and non-bankruptcy liquidations. Some fact-based research on this point
would be useful.
54. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2012) (modification of collective bargaining
agreements). Of course, for non-unionized employees, the debtor may do so
unilaterally.
55. See Secunda, supra note 2, at 873–74.
56. See generally 3 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE §
49:21 (3d ed. 2013). The main exception is in the Second Circuit, where severance
pay may be deemed to accrue upon termination of employment, rather than ratably
across an employee’s career. See e.g., Straus-Duparquet, Inc. v. Local Union No. 3
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 386 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967). The Fourth Circuit has
recently reached a similar conclusion with respect to severance during the prepetition priority period. See Matson v. Alarcon, 651 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2011). The
ABI Commission is considering severance pay issues. See Andrew Dawson, Minutes
of ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, LAB. & BENEFITS ADVISORY
COMMITTEE (Apr. 19, 2013), available at http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/
April%2019%20meeting%20minutes.docx, (“Discussion focused on the working
paper regarding severance issues under section 503.”).
57. In enacting the NLRA, Congress found that “[t]he inequality of bargaining
power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual
liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms
of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of
commerce . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). Similarly, in enacting Section 1113 of the
Bankruptcy Code, Senator Kennedy stated that the law’s intent was to prevent the
trustee from having unlimited discretionary power to repudiate labor contracts. 130
CONG. REC. S8898 (daily ed. Jun. 29, 1984). And, in enacting Section 1114, Congress
sought to protect the rights of retirees to continue to receive benefits irrespective of
their employer’s bankruptcy. See In re Arclin U.S. Holding, Inc., 416 B.R. 117, 119
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has been steadily declining, at least in the private sector.58 And union
membership has historically been low in the South, for example.59
That said, unions remain powerful advocates in the legislative
arena. Though he mentions one pending bill (Senator Hatch’s
proposal for a new type of pension platform),60 Professor Secunda has
not discussed the reforms organized labor has identified as important
to their constituents.
For example, much attention has been focused on The Protecting
Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2013 (H.R.
100), introduced by Representative John Conyers Jr. (D-MI) on
January 3, 2013. The bill’s stated purpose is to improve protections
for employees and retirees in business bankruptcies.61 House Bill 100
has been referred to the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee
on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law.62
Some view House Bill 100 as a “wish list,” and consider it unlikely
to pass in its current form because it is heavily tilted toward employee
interests.63
Among other things, the bill would amend the
Bankruptcy Code to:
• increase the priority claim for wages, salaries, or commissions,
including vacation and severance pay;
(Bankr. D. Del. 2009). Professor Secunda only briefly discusses Sections 1113 and
1114, but the literature on these provisions is extensive. See generally JOHN D. PENN
ET AL., LABOR ISSUES IN CHAPTER 11: AN OVERVIEW (2010), available at
http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/busreorg/vol9num5/labor.pdf.
58. See Steven Greenhouse, Share of the Work Force in a Union Falls to a 97Year Low, 11.3%, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/
business/union-membership-drops-despite-job-growth.html?_r=0.
59. See GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS
IN THE UNITED STATES (2004), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=key_workplace; see also Union Affiliation
of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by State, BUREAU LAB. STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t05.htm (last updated Jan. 24, 2014).
60. See Secunda, supra note 2 at 883.
61. See Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act, H.R.
100, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/housebill/100; see also John Conyers, Jr.: A Legislative Record of Jobs, Justice and Peace,
JOHN CONYERS, JR.: U.S. CONGRESSMAN, 1, 10, http://conyers.house.gov/_cache/files/
93cecf79-b4bb-4a41-939c-00302e5a53ca/Executive_Summary_Jobs_Justice_and_
Peace.pdf (stating that Rep. Conyers has introduced or cosponsored legislation since
1987 that has sought to level the playing field for employees and retirees in business
bankruptcies by requiring heightened standards to reject collective bargaining
agreements and reduce employee benefits).
62. See H.R. 100.
63. See e.g., Michael L. Bernstein, Testimony Before the ABI Commission to
Study the Reform of Chapter 11, AM. BANKR. INST. (March 14, 2013),
http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/statements/14mar2013/Michael_L_Bernst
ein.pdf.
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•

increase the priority claim for contributions to an employee
benefit plan;
• include severance pay (other than for insiders, senior
management, and highly compensated employees) as an
administrative expense;
• include damages for WARN Act violations as an
administrative expense;
• provide a claim for damages for rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement under Section 1113.64
In addition to these “claims” issues, and major reforms to Sections
1113 and 1114, House Bill 100 would require that in evaluating
purchase offers, the court consider the extent to which a bidder offers
to maintain existing jobs, preserve the terms and conditions of
employment, and assume or match pension and retiree health benefit
obligation.65
Assuming that solution is realistic, 66 it would
dramatically change the landscape with respect to unionized
employees and retirees, as well as the pension insurance system and
providers of health care coverage.
The Commission was established to “study and propose reforms to
Chapter 11 and related statutory provisions that will better balance
the goals of effectuating the effective reorganization of business
debtors with the attendant preservation and expansion of jobs . . . .”67
Its members include lawyers, workout professionals, and academics.68
At a field hearing in March 2013, the Commission heard testimony
from management- and union-side witnesses, a retired bankruptcy
judge and Joshua Gotbaum, the PBGC’s Director. Gotbaum
emphasized that the Commission’s charge is to “revisit and rebalance

64. Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2013,
H.R. 100, 113th Cong. §§ 101, 103, 105, 201 (2013).
65. Id. § 203. See also Judith Greenstone Miller & My Chi To, Legislative
Update, American Bar Association Business Bankruptcy Committee, Spring Meeting
of the Business Law Section 1, 5 (Apr. 4, 2013), available at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&ved=0CEg
QFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmeetings.abanet.org%2Fwebupload%2Fcommuplo
ad%2FCL160000%2Frelatedresources%2Flegislativeupdate20130404.doc&ei=Yc7a
UsTVAsrlsASF0oHgCA&usg=AFQjCNHm3jVnX4Ss0CENlWMGlqYR6KX4pg&si
g2=XtDd5b43Nw6md7Wp6HJ86A.
66. See Bernstein, supra note 63, at 12 (“The reality is that in many cases there is
no buyer who is willing to preserve all of the debtor’s employees’ jobs and assume all
of its pension and retiree liabilities.”).
67. Purpose of the Commission, AM. BANKR. INST., http://commission.abi.org/
purpose-commission (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
68. See id.
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Chapter 11, in pursuit of the twin goals of reorganization and just
treatment of creditors.”69
Given the ABI’s key role in providing bankruptcy information, the
Commission’s report could significantly affect the debate. Professor
Secunda should find an opportunity to collaborate or to offer his
services.
CONCLUSION
As a resource on comparative employment and bankruptcy law,
Professor Secunda’s Article will be a valuable addition to the
literature. While his proposals to increase priority treatment for
wages and pension contributions have support among interest groups,
it is not clear that his proposal for a wage guarantee fund is necessary.
With this response, I have suggested a need for greater focus on
protections for ongoing pension plans and the pension insurance
system (and any wage guarantee fund), the vagaries of legislation, and
bankruptcy reform efforts already underway. Scholars and law
reformers may want to take them into account in their respective
endeavors.

69. ABI COMM’N TO STUDY REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 34, at 1.

